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ABSTRACT

This unit is part of a continuing series on current foreign policy issues. This unit draws students into a debate on Russia's identity. Unlike previous units of this series, this one is not written from the U.S. perspective. Rather, students are asked to see the world through Russian eyes and to contemplate Russian choices in the areas of economic development, political organization, and foreign policy. At the core of the unit are three distinct directions, or futures, for Russia in the coming years. Each future is grounded in a clearly defined philosophy about Russia's place in the world and offers broad guidelines on fundamental public policy issues in Russia. By exploring a spectrum of alternatives, students gain a deeper understanding of the values and assumptions underlying Russia's ongoing political turmoil. The background reading prepares students to assess Russia's policy choices. Part 1 surveys four key periods of reform in Russian history, ranging from the reign of Peter the Great to the Gorbachev era. Students are called upon to weigh the implications of past reform efforts for Russia's current situation, and also to appreciate how Russians view their history. Part 2 reviews the momentous changes that have taken place in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, focusing in particular on economic reform, new political thinking, and Russia's evolving international relations. The unit includes a lesson plan and student activities. The unit opens with student role playing the four historical figures from Part 1. (Author/DK)

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CHOICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY



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Charting Russia's Future In The Post-Soviet Era

ALTERNATIVES FOR PUBLIC DEBATE
AND POLICY DEVELOPMENT

A project of the Center for Foreign Policy Development

Brown University, Box 1948, Providence, RI 02912

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THE CHOICES FOR THE 21ST CENTURY EDUCATION PROJECT was established at the Center for Foreign Policy Development to help citizens think constructively about foreign policy issues, to improve participatory citizenship skills, and to encourage public judgment on policy priorities.

THE CENTER FOR FOREIGN POLICY DEVELOPMENT of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University is a non-profit research organization. Its mandate is to bring together scholars, policymakers, and the public in a search for policy choices that can lead to a consensus on U.S. national security and foreign policy.

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Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era is part of a continuing series on current foreign policy issues. A new unit is published every three months during the academic year.

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for the 21st Century
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The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project develops curricula for high schools and colleges on current foreign policy issues and offers workshops, institutes, and in-service programs for high school teachers. Course materials place special emphasis on the importance of educating students in their participatory role as citizens.

The Choices for the 21st Century Education Project is a project of the **Center for Foreign Policy Development** of the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University.

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Note to Teachers

For centuries, the Russian people have wrestled with questions of identity. They have been torn between Asia and Europe, authoritarianism and liberal democracy, their attachment to the land and the attractions of the city, their spiritual richness and the pull of modern science. The struggle has produced many of the world's greatest writers, composers, and other artists. At the same time, it has resulted in a seemingly schizophrenic national character and has left deep political divisions. Today, Russia is passing through another time of troubles.

Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era draws students into the debate on Russia's identity. Unlike past units of the Choices for the 21st Century Education Project, *Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era* is not written from the U.S. perspective. Rather, students are asked to see the world through Russian eyes and to contemplate Russian choices in the areas of economic development, political organization, and foreign policy.

At the core of the unit are three distinct directions, or Futures, for Russia in the coming years. Each Future is grounded in a clearly defined philosophy about Russia's place in the world and offers broad guidelines on fundamental public policy issues in Russia. By exploring a spectrum of alternatives, students gain a deeper understanding of the values and assumptions underlying Russia's ongoing political turmoil. The background reading prepares students to assess Russia's policy choices. Part I surveys four key periods of reform in Russian history, ranging from the reign of Peter the Great to the Gorbachev era. Students are called upon to weigh the implications of past reform efforts for Russia's current situation, and also to appreciate how Russians view their history. Part II reviews the momentous changes that have taken place in Russia since the collapse of the Soviet Union, focusing in particular on economic reform, new political thinking, and Russia's evolving international relations.

Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan: *Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era* includes a lesson plan and student activities. The unit opens with students role playing the four historical figures featured in Part I of the background reading. The third and fourth days of the lesson plan involve a simulation in which students act as advocates for the three Futures or take on the role of Russian voters. On the fifth day, students draft a campaign platform for Russia based on their own values and beliefs.

Below is an outline of the lesson plan found on pages 25-27. You may also find the "Alternative Three-Day Lesson Plan" useful. The "Student Text" (pages 1-24) contains the background reading and the three Futures. Student handouts follow the lesson plan. The lesson plan offered in *Charting Russia's Future in the Post-Soviet Era* is a guide. Many teachers choose to devote additional time to certain activities. We hope that these suggestions help you in tailoring the unit to fit the needs of your classroom.

Homework: Read Part I of the background reading and complete "Study Guide — Part I"

Day One: Reform in Russian history: review and preparation

Homework: Complete preparations for the role play

Day Two: Reform in Russian history: presentation and discussion

Homework: Read Part II of the background reading and complete "Study Guide — Part II"

Day Three: Exploring the three Futures: organization and preparation

Homework: Complete preparations for the simulation


Day Four: Exploring the three Futures: debate and discussion

Homework: Read the three Futures, then fill out "Focusing Your Thoughts"

Day Five: Charting Russia's future

Extra Challenge: Complete campaign platform

Russia



Reprinted from Maps on File.

Part I: Lessons from Russia's Past

Late in the afternoon of October 6, 1993, the two stone-faced Russian soldiers guarding the tomb of Vladimir I. Lenin in Moscow's Red Square quietly walked away from their post. Their commander had received a decree issued by Russian President Boris Yeltsin earlier that day announcing that the post would be closed. Although Russian officials played down the significance of the decision, in historical terms it marked the end of an era.

Lenin founded the Soviet Union. He launched the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917, hoping to establish communism in Russia and then to spread his revolutionary doctrine to the entire world. After Lenin's death in 1924, the leaders of the Soviet Union put his mummified body on public display in Red Square, at the heart of Russia's ancient capital. For the next sixty-nine years, members of the precision-drilled honor guard stationed at Lenin's tomb were rotated on the hour.

Lenin had entrusted the Communist Party of his homeland with the mission of advancing communism throughout the world. By the time the honor guard at his tomb was removed, little remained of Lenin's dream.

The communist system that Lenin helped create began crumbling in the late 1980s after many years of decline. People in the Soviet Union lost faith in the belief that communism held the promise of a better future. At the end of 1991, the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist. Russia, by far the largest of the fifteen states to emerge from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, was a country at a historical juncture.

Russia in transition

For nearly three centuries, Russians have held a central role on the world stage. Their vast land, nearly twice the size of the United States, contains many of the world's most important natural resources. Russia has also produced giants in the sciences, music, literature, and other fields. The Russian army, a formidable force as early as the 18th century, today is second in power only to the U.S. military. Moreover, Russia's huge nuclear arsenal places an awesome responsibility in the hands of Russian leaders.

Russians have long seen themselves as occupying a special place in the world. The tsars (a word that comes from the Roman title of caesar) who ruled Russia for nearly five centuries before communism were imbued with a sense of mission. Russian Orthodox Christianity and the expansion of the Russian empire over much of Eurasia gave Russians a feeling of uniqueness. Russians in the 16th and 17th centuries often referred to their country as the "third Rome," believing that the torch of spiritual leadership for the Christian world had been passed to them from Rome and Constantinople.

Communism represented a rejection of Christianity, but in many respects it took on the form of a religion. Under Soviet rule, Russians presented the communist system to the peoples of the world as an alternative to the societies of the United States, Britain, France, and other countries of the West.

Russia at a Glance

Area:	6,592,800 square miles
Arable land:	11%
Population:	149,500,000
Life expectancy at birth:	53 male, 74 female
Labor force:	22% ag.; 29% ind.; 26% services
Telephone lines per 1,000 people:	150
Motor vehicles per 1,000 people:	60

With the collapse of Soviet communism and the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russians have been left to chart a new course for their country. The process of change has been marked by sharp political divisions. Days before the guard post at Lenin's tomb was closed, forces opposed to Boris Yeltsin's reforms battled in Moscow with troops loyal to the president for control of the Russian government. They made their last stand in the Russian parliament building — the center of opposition to Yeltsin's efforts to dismantle the communist system — not surrendering control until the top floors of the parliament were in flames and as many as 140 people had died.

In December 1993, elections to the Russian parliament affirmed the lack of consensus in Russian

politics. Although supporters of Yeltsin captured the largest share of seats in the Russian legislature, the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democrats emerged as the most popular political party. Liberal Democrat leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy pledged to restore the borders of the Soviet Union and reverse Yeltsin's reforms.

Russian reformers had hoped that the elections would serve as a clean break with the Soviet past. Instead, the results suggested that many of the most important questions about Russia's direction are unlikely to be resolved for years.

Your assignment

In this unit, you will be asked to step into Russian shoes and consider Russia's future. You will be confronted with the same questions that the people of Russia are now debating: What principles should guide the development of Russia's economy? What political system is best for Russia? What role should Russia play in international affairs?

To prepare for the challenge ahead, you will begin with a brief survey of Russian history, focusing in particular on past efforts to change Russian society. Russians place much more importance on history than most Americans do. For them, Russian history is closely connected to both their individual identity and their image of Russia as a nation. Interpreting the past is a stepping-stone to thinking about the future. The second part of the background reading deals with the events that have occurred since the Soviet Union came to an end on December 31, 1991. Under President Yeltsin, Russia has entered a period of tumultuous reform. In this section, you will learn how the new Russia has changed in terms of its economic development, political thinking, and international relations.

RUSSIA'S HISTORICAL LEGACY

The history of modern Russia can be divided into two big segments: the tsarist period that stretched from the 15th century to 1917 and the Soviet era that began in 1917 and continued until 1991. Sandwiched between these two epochs was a short, unsuccessful attempt to fashion a democracy in 1917 after the fall of Tsar Nicholas II and before the seizure of power by Lenin.

When Russians look backward today, they often have mixed feelings about what elements of the past should be preserved. Almost everyone agrees that the worst features of communism — the prison camps and the secret police, for example — should be buried once and for all. But at the same time many people long for the guaranteed employment, free health care, low-rent housing, and predictable order of the Soviet system. Similarly, the tsarist period evokes differing opinions. For some, the values embodied by the tsar, the Russian Orthodox Church, and the empire are revered. For others, the tsarist period is a symbol of authoritarianism and backwardness. Finally, the short-lived democratic regime of 1917 presents another set of questions. The government led by Alexander Kerensky sought to transform Russia into a Western-style parliamentary democracy. However, Kerensky's failure to build a political consensus around his reform program, as well as the hardships caused by World War I, undermined popular support for the young democracy. Many Russians draw a parallel between the reform government of 1917 and efforts to establish democratic institutions today. They ask why democracy lasted only seven months in 1917, and debate whether history is likely to repeat itself.

Authoritarian traditions

Whatever their political convictions, Russians agree that their country lacks a tradition of democracy. From tsarist times, Russia has been led by rulers who enjoyed virtually unlimited power. Individual rights, the freedom of expression, and other democratic principles had little meaning in tsarist Russia and the Soviet Union. In addition, the Soviets destroyed the concept of private property and elevated the power of the state to new heights.

Historically, reform in Russia came from the top. The force that drove previous attempts at change was the desire to strengthen the state, often in the face of an external foe. Tsarist and Soviet rulers also sought to fend off threats to their authority as democratic values spread beyond Russia's borders. The history of reform in Russia — both its accomplishments and its failures — is now being studied intently by Russians weighing their country's options for the future.

Peter the Great

Tsar Peter I (1682-1725), known as Peter the Great, was the first important modernizer in Russian history. Peter I inherited a state that stretched from near the shores of the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. His vast domain, however, was largely cut off from the scientific and political revolutions underway in Europe at the time. During a tour of Western Europe in 1697-98, Peter I was exposed to the technological advances of his distant neighbors. He returned to Russia and launched a sweeping effort to remake his country along European lines.

Peter I concentrated on the military, reorganizing the army and creating a navy. New industries were established to supply the needs of the military. After acquiring territory along the Baltic Sea in a war against Sweden, the tsar built a new capital at St. Petersburg — Russia's "window on the West." Peter I even taxed

noblemen who refused to shave their beards and adopt a more European appearance.

Having ensured the security of the state against the enemy, it is requisite to endeavor to win glory for it by means of the arts and sciences.

—Peter the Great

Russians today recall Peter the Great as the tsar who thrust Russia into the center of European affairs. With a modern military, Russia was destined to rank among the leading European powers. The tsar's efforts to open his country to the West continue to have significance for Russia today.

Russians have long suffered from an inferiority complex with respect to the West. For much of its history, Russia has been on the margins of European civilization. When the Renaissance was dawning in

Western Europe in the 15th century, Russians were still struggling to reclaim their land from Mongol invaders. While the foundations of modern Western science were being laid in the 17th century, Russia was gripped by political chaos and close-minded religious zeal.

Geography has reinforced the Russian sense of isolation. Much of Russia is cold and inhospitable, far removed from the Atlantic Ocean currents that warm Western Europe. Moscow, for example, lies on the same latitude as the Hudson Bay and is blanketed in snow for nearly six months of the year. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia's current borders do not extend much beyond those that prevailed during the early reign of Peter the Great, and once again are far removed from Western Europe.


Peter the Great is remembered especially fondly by Russians who value their country's great role in the international arena. In the name of modernization, however, Peter I substantially increased the power of the state and ruthlessly crushed his enemies.

Reprinted from *The Horizon History of Russia*.



This 300-year-old cartoon shows Peter I cutting the beard of a nobleman.

Russia's Expansion under Peter the Great



Reprinted from Historical Maps on File.

Alexander II

Tsar Alexander II (1855-81) is best known for his decision to free Russia's serfs in 1861. He also took the first steps toward establishing the rule of law in the Russian empire.

Alexander II came to power at a time when economic pressure and social unrest were growing. Many of his advisers believed that Russia was rapidly falling behind the industrializing countries of the West. The inept performance of Russia's army against British and French forces during the Crimean War of 1853-56 served to illustrate their concerns. They convinced the tsar that the system of serfdom was a root cause of Russia's backwardness.

Like feudalism in Europe, Russian serfdom had deep roots. Beginning in the 16th and 17th centuries, Russian peasants were obligated to work the estates of landowning nobles. But whereas the underpinnings of feudalism broke down in much of Europe in the 17th and 18th centuries, serfdom in Russia became more entrenched. By the 1800s, Russian serfs were virtual slaves. They could be bought and sold, moved from one estate to another, and were barred from owning land. Many Russian landowners, however, were increasingly unable to afford caring for the serfs under their control. Moreover, Russian army officers complained that serfs made poor soldiers.

Alexander II's order to free the serfs did little to immediately improve the lives of Russian peasants. The emancipated serfs were subject to new taxes, and in most cases remained tied to the land. Freeing the serfs, however, created a new class of small farmers and opened the door to other important reforms by Alexander II.

It is better to abolish serfdom from above than to await the time when it will begin to abolish itself from below.

—Alexander II

Under Alexander II, elected assemblies were permitted at the local level to address issues such as road maintenance, irrigation, and taxation. Although by Western standards the power of the local councils was meager, for Russia the councils represented a

significant departure from the absolute authority of the tsar. In addition, Alexander II introduced jury trials and decreed that all citizens should receive equal treatment before the law.

The Tsar Liberator, as Alexander II came to be known, was willing to relinquish some of his authority to help modernize Russia. At the same time, he was working to undercut the appeal of new political philosophies that were emerging in Russia during the 1800s.

In the decades before Alexander II's reign, two important intellectual movements had emerged in Russia. On one side were the Slavophiles — a group that identified closely with Russia's ethnic Slavic roots. The Slavophiles believed that their country should be built on the traditional values of the Russian village and the Russian Orthodox Church. They called on Russia to turn its back on new programs for political and economic reform circulating in Europe.

The other group, the Westernizers, wanted Russia to join the tide of change sweeping Europe. They viewed Russian tradition as a barrier to progress. During the later years of Alexander II's rule, many Westernizers favored the creation of a liberal democracy along the lines of the systems that existed in Britain and the United States.

Meanwhile, political currents in Europe inspired more radical movements for change in Russia. Russian socialists, for instance, sought to overthrow the authority of the tsar and the church. Many of them looked to Russia's downtrodden peasants to ignite revolution and redistribute the land. When few peasants responded to the call for revolution, radical movements often turned to violence to challenge the government. In 1881, a revolutionary terrorist killed Alexander II (and himself) with a homemade hand grenade. In response to his father's assassination, Alexander III began his reign by launching a harsh crackdown against political activity in Russia.

Alexander II is remembered today by his admirers as the first Russian ruler to try to put Russia on the path toward democracy. The severe repression that followed his reforms, however, has led many to question Russia's capacity, both then and now, for peaceful reform.

Nicholas II

Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917) was a reluctant reformer. Like his father, Alexander III, Nicholas II relied heavily on the secret police and heavy-handed tactics to maintain order. Two events, however, forced the tsar to accept the need for change.

In 1904, the Russian navy suffered a humiliating defeat against Japan in a battle over dominance in the Sea of Japan. While the Russo-Japanese War continued on land in 1905, political unrest broke out in Russia. The Revolution of 1905, as the turmoil came to be known, did not subside until Nicholas II announced major political reforms.

To satisfy his democratic critics, Nicholas II created a representative assembly, or Duma, and pledged that basic civil rights would be protected. In measures that went well beyond those of Alexander II, the tsar conceded that he would share power with elected officials. Elections in 1906, however, produced a legislature that supported rapid democratic reform. The tsar responded by dissolving the first Duma, then the second, and finally changing the electoral laws. The third Duma, elected in 1907, was more conservative, and Nicholas II adopted some of the legislature's moderate recommendations for reform.

The period from 1905 to 1914 (the year Russia entered World War I) has particular relevance for Russians today. Among those Russians who find hope

for democratic progress in Russia's past, the 1905-14 period represents an era of promise. They note that Russia at the time was experiencing the most rapid industrial growth in Europe and that democratic institutions such as a free press and political parties were gaining acceptance.

We must avoid taking too great strides. We should find ourselves, later, close to being a democratic republic. That would be senseless and criminal.

—Nicholas II

In fact, many of Nicholas II's advisers believed that Russia was in a race against time in the years before World War I. In the area of defense and foreign policy, the Russo-Japanese War had rekindled fears about Russia's vulnerability. Geography was Russia's main security problem. To the west, a broad plain offered invaders an unobstructed route into the Russian heartland. In 1812, Napoleon had led his army all the way to Moscow before being forced back by the Russian winter. Likewise, German generals in the early 1900s were expected to take advantage of Russia's lack of natural defenses if war should break out. In addition, Russia's access to the sea was limited. Russia's navy in the Black Sea and the Baltic Sea could easily be bottled up by an enemy, while Russian ports in the Arctic Ocean were frozen for much of the year. Nicholas II hoped that stepped-up industrialization and efforts to modernize the military would reduce Russia's vulnerability to attack.

The tsar's government was also racing to prevent a political and social explosion. The Duma, for example, had been founded largely to win over the tsar's democratic critics and undercut the appeal of revolutionaries. Perhaps more important were the agricultural reforms undertaken by the tsar's prime minister, Peter Stolypin.

Stolypin's goal was to create a class of prosperous, conservative small farmers, much like the families that worked the

Percentage of World Manufacturing Output

	1750	1800	1860	1900
Russia	5.0	5.6	7.0	8.8
Britain	1.9	4.3	19.9	18.5
France	4.0	4.2	7.9	6.8
Germany	2.9	3.5	4.9	13.2
U.S.	0.1	0.8	7.2	23.6

Data from *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.

land in France and the United States. To achieve his aim, Stolypin sought to break up the village communes in which peasants held land collectively. Stolypin blamed the collectivist mentality for stifling individual initiative. Stolypin also allowed peasants to buy state-owned land and established a special bank to loan them money for equipment, seeds, and other farming needs. Stolypin was assassinated in 1911 while attending an opera with the tsar. The assassin was later discovered to be a double agent.

For Russians today, Stolypin's assassination symbolizes the contradictions of the 1905-14 period. On the one hand, advocates of cautious, gradual reform take heart in the robust economic growth and the fledgling democratic institutions that marked the period. On the other hand, those who question the value of the era's reforms see the 1905-14 period as merely another cycle of violence and repression in Russian history.

Mikhail Gorbachev

Between 1914 and the time Mikhail Gorbachev (1985-91) came to power, Russia had experienced World War I, a civil war, the imposition of communism, World War II, and years of economic stagnation. Decades of suffering and communist repression had left the Russian people weary and cynical. Whatever hopes had been placed in the Bolshevik Revolution had long since evaporated.

Gorbachev, the youngest Soviet leader since Stalin, felt the weight of the past as he developed a plan for reform. Like many other Soviet officials of his generation, Gorbachev acknowledged that his country's economy was stalled, especially in the high-tech areas that were essential to the strength of the Soviet military. If the Soviet Union was to keep up with its Cold War rival, the United States, and maintain its superpower status, serious economic reform would have to take place. But while Gorbachev favored shaking up the economy, he did not want to topple the communist system that had been built by Soviet leaders over many decades.

Gorbachev's most difficult task involved breaking the hold of Josef Stalin over the Soviet people. Stalin (1924-53) had been the chief architect of the Soviet system. He believed that the Soviet Union had to

industrialize at all costs in order to defend communism against the capitalist countries of the West. To achieve his goals, Stalin fashioned a "command economy." Under his rule, government planners in Moscow sought to control all aspects of economic activity and to direct the distribution of goods for the whole country.

Stalin succeeded in making the Soviet Union into an industrial giant. By the time of his death, the Soviet economy was second in size only to that of the United States. Soviet industrial might helped the Soviets defeat Nazi Germany in World War II. The struggle, known in the Soviet Union as the Great Patriotic War, left 20 to 30 million Soviets dead. The enormous wartime sacrifices were hailed by Stalin and his successors as a tribute to the Soviet system and the solidarity of the Russian people.

Likewise, Soviet industrialization was accomplished at a staggering human cost. At least 10 million Soviets died under Stalin's regime. Peasants suffered the most. Stalin's policies forced them to give up their land and join huge state-run farms. In addition, peasant traditions were smashed and the Russian Orthodox Church was deprived of its authority. Although Soviet leaders Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev ended Stalin's reign of terror, they did little to alter the command economy.

Gorbachev took a bolder approach. Under Gorbachev's program of *perestroika* (restructuring), Moscow's control of the Soviet economy was loosened. Gorbachev held that enterprises should be responsible for holding down costs and responding to consumer demand, rather than relying on government subsidies. Factory managers and farm directors were given greater decision-making power. Small-scale private and cooperative businesses were legalized. The Soviet Union also became more open to foreign investment. Gorbachev hoped that the introduction of Western technology and free-market forces would spur the Soviet economy forward.

Perestroika, however, was a halfway measure. Gorbachev feared that lifting price controls and taking other measures to create a free-market economy would undermine the authority of the Communist Party and turn people against the Soviet system. He also balked at recognizing the institution of private property.

In addition to tackling economic reform, Gorbachev liberalized the Soviet political system. His policy of *glasnost* (openness) allowed greater freedom of expression. Public attention was soon drawn to the Soviet Union's many problems: government corruption, environmental pollution, economic inefficiency, etc. *Glasnost* also gave the Soviet Union's many nationalities an opportunity to air their grievances, and reopened discussion about the horrors committed by the Stalin regime.

Together, *perestroika* and *glasnost* ate away at the legitimacy of the Soviet state. Instead of sparking initiative, *perestroika* contributed to a breakdown of the framework that held together the Soviet command economy. By 1990, the economy was in a tailspin. The country's gross national product (GNP) fell 8 percent that year. The next year, it dropped 19 percent. Meanwhile, the problems and injustices exposed under *glasnost* undercut the authority of the Communist Party. Particularly in the Soviet Union's fourteen non-Russian republics, movements arose to reduce the power of the central government in Moscow.

Gorbachev's foreign policy deepened the divisions among the people of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev set out to settle the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States that had begun in the late 1940s. The Soviet leader initiated agreements on nuclear arms control with the United States and encouraged foreign investment in his country. In 1989, Gorbachev did not intervene when popular movements in Eastern Europe toppled communist governments that had been dominated by Moscow since the end of World War II. In 1990, Gorbachev reluctantly gave his assent to the reunification of West Germany and East Germany.

While the international changes brought by Gorbachev's policies were hailed abroad, Gorbachev received mixed reviews in the Soviet Union. Many Soviets, especially the younger generation, supported his efforts to open up the country to the West. In everything from science and computers to music and fashion, they looked forward to exploring the interests and tastes of their counterparts in Paris, Tokyo, and Los Angeles. Others, particularly those who remembered World War II, believed that Gorbachev had surrendered their country's national honor to the West.

The loss of Moscow's satellites in Eastern Europe was seen by many as a heavy blow to Soviet security. Moreover, the overthrow of communist regimes in Eastern Europe inspired nationalities in the Soviet Union seeking to break free of Moscow. By the end of 1991, Gorbachev had few allies in his effort to hold the Soviet Union together.

The failure of *perestroika* and *glasnost* have cast a long shadow over reform efforts today in Russia. Undeniably, much of the responsibility rests with short-sighted and poorly developed policies introduced by Gorbachev. But many Russians believe that there were much bigger obstacles to Gorbachev's success. Early in his leadership, Gorbachev himself emphasized that the Soviet people needed to break free of their dependence on the government. According to Gorbachev, Russians, and later Soviets, had been conditioned to look toward the "good tsar" to solve their problems. As a result, many had given up on their own creativity and initiative.

It is necessary to expunge from the people's minds a belief in the "good tsar," in the all-powerful center, in the assumption that someone at the top will impose order and organize change.

—Mikhail Gorbachev

The Gorbachev era also raised questions about other aspects of the Russian past. In launching his reform program, Gorbachev was taking aim at the remnants of totalitarianism still lingering from the days of Stalin. Under the totalitarian system, the state sought to control every aspect of life, from organizing youth groups to determining the content of movies and novels. While totalitarianism is usually associated with communism, and particularly with the Stalinist era, some Russians find the roots of totalitarianism in Russian history. They note that many of the worst features of Soviet totalitarianism — the secret police, restrictions on travel both inside and outside the country, the government-imposed isolation from foreign influences — had their origins under the tsars. Assuming their interpretation is correct, reform in today's Russia will require profound changes in society.

Part II: The New Russia

A new era in Russian history began on August 19, 1991, when Russian President Boris Yeltsin climbed on top of an armored personnel carrier in front of the Russian parliament to announce his opposition to a coup organized by hard-line communists. Yeltsin called on Russians to launch a general strike and appealed to the military to turn against the coup plotters. Within three days of Yeltsin's appearance, the coup attempt collapsed.

Although Yeltsin had made his career as a Communist Party official in his hometown in western Siberia, he emerged as a strong opponent of party privileges during the Gorbachev era. In 1987, his criticism cost him his position in the party elite. Nonetheless, Yeltsin's popularity soared, and in 1991 he received 60 percent of the vote to win the presidency of Russia.

Yeltsin received much of the credit for thwarting the coup. While memories of his victory were still fresh, he stripped the Communist Party of its authority and claimed many of the institutions and resources of the Soviet central government for Russia. By the time the Soviet Union officially ceased to exist and Gorbachev resigned from office at the end of December 1991, Yeltsin had a firm grip on the presidency of Russia.

Yeltsin's agenda

Yeltsin's goals went well beyond bolstering the political power of the Russian president. A whirlwind of activity by Yeltsin in the final months of 1991 and early 1992 indicated that he was motivated by a far-reaching plan for reform.

Shortly after the failed coup, Yeltsin recognized the independence of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania — republics that under Gorbachev had been at the forefront of efforts to break free of Moscow's control. He then pledged to respect the independence of the other former Soviet republics. In December 1991, Russia took the lead in forming the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to promote military and economic cooperation among the former Soviet republics.

In the area of economic reform, the most important changes began in January 1992. In a program known as "shock therapy," price controls were lifted

on 90 percent of the goods sold in Russia. At the same time, government spending was slashed and plans were drawn up to place state-run companies in the hands of private owners.

Yeltsin's efforts represented the most sweeping reform agenda in Russian history. His policies advanced change on three fronts. Politically, he destroyed the Communist Party's monopoly on power and pushed for a multi-party democracy. Economically, he moved away from the centrally planned command economy. In foreign policy, he addressed the loss of Russia's empire and superpower status.

Signs of opposition

Yeltsin's popularity at first overwhelmed many of his potential opponents. By the summer of 1992, however, several contrasting political viewpoints were beginning to take shape. Changes in the political climate reflected the difficulties besetting Russia. Most important were the economic problems. Shock therapy had sparked protests among the millions of Russians who were unable to afford the expensive consumer items that lined store shelves. In addition, the drop in industrial production that had begun under Gorbachev continued. The threat of widespread unemployment heightened anxiety among the public.

Russia's international relations in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse also fueled doubts about Yeltsin. Tensions with Ukraine and other former Soviet republics were rising. Resentment grew over reports that Russians living outside their homeland were facing discrimination. Hundreds of thousands of Russian troops stationed in other former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe were returning home to housing shortages and unemployment. In the meantime, many Russians came to believe that the West was largely indifferent to their plight.

Finally, the attitude of Yeltsin and many of his advisers seemed to change. There was a growing understanding that Russia would be in a period of flux for years, if not decades. Many reformers who had hoped to apply Western economic models to the problems of Russia were having second thoughts. Likewise,

the initial rush to cooperate with the United States and Western Europe in foreign policy gave way to a reassessment of Russia's role in the world.

Russia's identity crisis

Since the summer of 1992, Russians have been caught up in a wide-ranging debate about where their country should be heading. Americans, too, have faced important decisions in recent decades, but not since the Civil War has the United States been torn by fundamental questions about our country's national identity. As was discussed in Part I of the background reading, Russians have plunged deep into their country's history to gain a better insight into their future choices. At the same time, they have heatedly debated the meaning of developments that have occurred since the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

In the following pages, you will learn about the new Russia. Three critical areas will be examined: the impact of economic and political change on Russian society; the emergence of new political philosophies; and Russia's international relations.


ECONOMIC CHANGES

The economic reforms initiated by President Yeltsin have turned Russian society on its head. Throughout much of Russian history, and especially during the Soviet era, economic equality was a core principle of Russian society. Suspicion and envy were often directed at those who climbed above their neighbors financially. Since the fall of communism, however, a new philosophy has arisen stressing economic opportunity over equality. The shift has left most Russians bewildered and apprehensive. Many of them have seen their standards of living plunge. At the same time, they have witnessed the rise of a new class of wealthy entrepreneurs.

Moscow in particular is a city of contrasts. Not far from the Kremlin, the center of Russian power since the 14th century, haggard pensioners sell off their possessions to buy bread. Many line the sidewalks for hours, offering for sale no more than a single comb or a jar of homemade jam. Meanwhile, the newly rich race by in shiny Mercedes and BMWs on their way to high-priced

restaurants and casinos that have opened in recent years. The old social order has been demolished too. In 1992, crime jumped 27 percent. Organized crime gangs have made extortion and drug trafficking commonplace, contributing in large part to a homicide rate higher than that of the United States. In many Russian cities, shopkeepers, small factory owners, and other fledgling businessmen are forced to pay protection money to the Russian mafia. Mafia bosses have also come to dominate entire sectors of the economy, such as foreign trade and restaurants.

The sudden changes cannot help but shock Russians accustomed to the Soviet system. The Soviet Union after Stalin's death placed a premium on stability and security. Few people other than the Communist Party elite would have been considered rich by American standards, but neither was there much desperate poverty. Soviet officials kept down costs for housing, bread, and other basic necessities through government subsidies. Apartment rent, for example,



typically amounted to less than 5 percent of a family's income. Guaranteed employment was the foundation of the communist system. Workers believed that their jobs were protected regardless of economic conditions or changes in technology. Moreover, employment was tied to housing, health care, special deliveries of food, and other benefits.

I brought up my kids under Soviet power and I managed somehow. But how can a single mother do that today? Only the new rich can do it.

—Middle-aged woman

Much of the anxiety that has gripped Soviet society since 1992 has been linked to the fear of unemployment. The team of economic advisers that introduced Russia's shock therapy in 1992 acknowledged that millions of workers would lose their jobs as the country underwent the transition to a free-market economy. The "Boys in Reeboks," as the reformers were called, realized that many of the inefficient, state-run factories that had been kept alive during the Soviet era would have to close or drastically trim their work forces. They predicted, however, that free-market competition would give rise to new companies and generate new opportunities for employment.

The key battleground in the first year of economic reforms was the budget. On one side, the reformers favored cutting government subsidies to state-run industries to spur innovation. Their opponents in the Russian parliament countered that the reform plan would result in economic chaos.

The political tug-of-war produced a confusing economic picture. By the summer of 1992, the forces in parliament had succeeded in maintaining the flow of government subsidies to big factories. Consequently, unemployment rose only slightly. Government presses, however, were working overtime to print money so that managers of state-run factories could pay their workers. At the same time, government officials imposed heavy taxes to hold down the budget deficit.

The economic record for 1992 pleased no one. Prices on consumer goods increased 25 times. Production fell by 20 percent, while the buying power of workers dropped by more than 40 percent.

Winners and losers

The Russian economy remained troubled in 1993, although increasingly the reform process was producing winners and losers. Among the winners were the entrepreneurs able to adjust quickly to the tastes of well-off Russian consumers.

Although most Russians can afford little more than basic necessities, there is nonetheless a growing demand for stylish clothing, expensive cars, and other luxuries. Yeltsin's campaign to place state-run firms in private hands also has created a new breed of financial specialists. Banking, insurance, stock brokerage, and other financial services all have gained a foothold in the Russian economy. By the end of 1993, nearly half of the country's state-run enterprises were under private ownership, and nearly one-quarter of industrial workers were employed by privately owned companies.

Russia's export-oriented industries also hold out promise for the future. Russia's oil and gas reserves, for example, are among the largest in the world. And although energy production in Russia began falling in the late 1980s, foreign investment and new technology are expected to revive the industry. Russia's high-tech military industries also have remained competitive in the world market. Despite objections from the United States and the disintegration of the old Soviet alliance system, Russian aircraft, missiles, and tanks have continued to win customers in the Middle East and East Asia.

The likely losers in the economic reform process are those industries unable to compete in the global economy. Many of Russia's big state-run enterprises fit into this category. Overcoming the Soviet past has been a difficult challenge for factory managers. The closed nature of the Soviet economy discouraged technological innovation, leaving many Russian factories with outdated and inefficient equipment. Moreover, Soviet industry was particularly wasteful of raw materials and energy. For example, the Soviet Union used 80 percent more steel than the United States, even though its economy was less than half the size of the U.S. economy. The Soviet mentality led to nightmarish pollution as well. In many areas, industrial wastes were dumped untreated into rivers and lakes. The extraction of oil,



coal, minerals, and other natural resources typically left behind barren wastelands, especially in Siberia.

Breakaway regions

As Russia has opened up its economy to the world, economists have begun to calculate winners and losers on a regional basis as well. The regions with the best economic prospects are those with marketable resources. The vast but sparsely populated Yakutia region in eastern Siberia, for example, is rich in diamonds and gold, while the Tyumen region in western Siberia ranks behind only the Persian Gulf in its production of crude oil and gas. In addition, port cities such as Vladivostok in Russia's Far East and St. Petersburg are expected to benefit from increased trade.

As the political crisis between Yeltsin and the Russian parliament worsened in mid-1993, several regional leaders took advantage of the political deadlock to assert their own authority. A "Republic of the Urals" was declared in Yeltsin's hometown of Yekaterinburg. Soon after, a "Maritime Republic" was proclaimed in Vladivostok and an "East Siberian Republic" was announced in Irkutsk. In the case of oil-rich Tatarstan, an area the size of West Virginia within Russia, regionalism mixed with ethnic pride. Tatar leaders — Muslim descendants of the Mongolian horsemen who

conquered Russia in the 13th century — demanded greater control over local resources.

The possibility that local regions of Russia might strike out to seek their own economic fortunes has alarmed officials in Moscow. After defeating his opponents in parliament in October 1993, Yeltsin called for new elections to regional assemblies and replaced a number of defiant regional leaders. Russia's new constitution, approved by voters in December 1993, likewise reflects Yeltsin's desire to restrict the power of the regions. The Russian president's argument

for a strong central government is supported by officials in industrial regions. They fear that a breakdown in central authority would deprive them of raw materials and investment.

NEW POLITICAL PHILOSOPHIES

On December 12, 1993, Russian voters took part in the freest elections in Russian history. The results of the balloting, however, left many observers questioning the viability of democracy and economic reform in Russia. Among the thirteen political parties that campaigned for seats in parliament, extreme nationalists known as the Liberal Democrats captured 23 percent of the vote to emerge as the leading party. Russia's Choice, the party most closely aligned with Yeltsin, finished a distant second with 15 percent of the vote, barely outpacing the third-place Communist Party. Other reform parties also fared poorly.

Candidates elected from the party slates filled half the seats in the 450-member State Duma — roughly the equivalent of the U.S. House of Representatives. In the races for the other half of the seats, which were held on a regional basis, reformers were more successful. Likewise, reformers won a shaky majority in the parliament's upper chamber, or Federation

Council (the counterpart of the U.S. Senate), where all 176 deputies were regionally elected.

The December 1993 elections foreshadowed continued political turmoil in Russia. Most worrisome for reformers was the appeal Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of the oddly named Liberal Democrats. Zhirinovskiy based his campaign on stirring up feelings of wounded national pride. Much of his rhetoric — which included threats to reclaim Alaska and blow nuclear radiation toward the Baltic republics — seemed outlandish. Nonetheless, his call for increased arms exports to revive Russian industry and stiff measures to curb crime won popular support. Analysis of the election results showed that Zhirinovskiy ran especially well among factory workers and soldiers. Zhirinovskiy supporters reported that law and order and economic stability ranked at the top of their priorities.

When I come to power, there will be a dictatorship. There's nothing like fear to make people work better.

—Vladimir Zhirinovskiy

Russian reformers maintained that Zhirinovskiy's strong showing in the election was largely a protest vote against economic hardship and a reflection of their own lack of political organization. Indeed, despair and apathy emerged as the clearest message of the elections. Only 55 percent of the Russian electorate went to the polls and few were involved in the election campaign.

Yeltsin supporters took consolation in the fact that the president's proposed constitution was approved by 58 percent of voters. The document strengthens the powers of Yeltsin at the expense of the parliament. According to the constitution, the president would be able to dissolve the lower house of parliament in a political crisis. The president would also be given considerable authority to make appointments to the executive and judicial branches of government.

While Yeltsin applauded the passage of the constitution as an affirmation of his policies, other Russian democrats expressed concern that the document's sweeping executive powers could ultimately serve the

forces of authoritarianism. Indeed, Zhirinovskiy strongly backed the constitution, looking forward to the day when the reins of the central government would be in his hands. Zhirinovskiy has promised to run for president in 1996.

FOREIGN POLICY

Historically, Russian leaders have focused their energies on strengthening Russia's position in the world. From Peter the Great to Mikhail Gorbachev, government policy has centered on international relations, particularly on matters relating to the military. President Yeltsin is the first Russian leader to place problems at home ahead of national security issues.

The West

In the months following the Soviet collapse, Yeltsin's foreign policy was driven by a desire to forge close relations with the West. Russia cooperated with the West in imposing sanctions on Iraq, a former Soviet ally, after the Persian Gulf War. In addition, Russia put aside the ethnic bonds between Russia and Serbia in supporting sanctions against Yugoslavia.

Even more significant was Russia's policy on nuclear weapons. Russia inherited 85 percent of the Soviet Union's long-range nuclear missiles and the great bulk of the 32,000 warheads in the Soviet nuclear arsenal. In 1992, Russia struck the most sweeping arms control agreement ever with the United States. Under the treaty, Russia agreed to reduce by more than half the number of nuclear warheads capable of reaching the United States.

In turn, Russia received economic assistance from the West. In 1992, for example, Western countries supplied Russia with \$13 billion in credits to allow Russia to import goods from the West. In addition, Russia was given extra time to pay back its more than \$80 billion foreign debt. However, help from the West did not meet Russian expectations. Russian leaders complained that most of the \$24 billion in aid pledged to Russia by the world's seven wealthiest democracies in 1993 was not delivered. For their part, Western officials maintained that economic assistance would be wasted unless Russia curbed government spending,

reduced inflation, and restructured the economy. They pushed Yeltsin to speed up reform.

It would be better to go hungry for a few days than to lose one's pride and independence for decades.

—former Soviet official

Meanwhile, the influx of foreign investment that many Russians were anticipating did not occur. Foreign investment in 1992 totaled a meager \$1.5 billion, and several Western companies that had entered Russia during the Gorbachev era closed their operations.

The former Soviet Union

While Yeltsin's government sought to build new bridges to the West, relations with the other states of the former Soviet Union (FSU) were initially overlooked. Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev did not make his first tour of the other FSU countries until April 1992. More important, little attention was paid to trade relations within the FSU. Under the Soviet system, the republics had been linked economically not only to Moscow, but to each other. Without a framework to sort out economic relations, many of the ties that had held the Soviet economy together unraveled. As a result, trade in Russia and the other FSU states plummeted, contributing in large part to the region's economic crisis. With respect to defense, Russia lost possession of radar stations, air bases, and other key military installations located elsewhere in the FSU. These facilities had been deliberately built on the periphery of the Soviet Union to protect the heartland of the country from attack.

The breakdown of relations within the FSU heightened concern that Russia was losing influence among its neighbors. By the end of 1992, Russian foreign policymakers shifted

their focus to the other states of the FSU. A new term — “near abroad” — emerged to describe Russia's perspective on the other former Soviet republics. Reasserting Russia's influence over countries that had been part of the Russian and Soviet empires, however, has been no easy task. Russia's top foreign policy priority, and its biggest headache, has been Ukraine.


In many respects, Ukraine is the birthplace of Russian culture. Kiev, Ukraine's capital, was the center of the Russian state when Russia's leaders accepted Christianity in 988. Today, Ukraine is a country of 52 million people (22 percent of them Russian), rich farmland, vital industries, and the third most powerful nuclear arsenal in the world.

In 1992, Russia and Ukraine butted heads over how the Soviet armed forces should be divided up among the republics. Ownership of the Black Sea fleet was a particularly thorny subject. In addition, Russian nationalists pressed their leaders to wrest control of the Crimean peninsula in the Black Sea from Ukraine. The Crimea, where Russians formed a majority of the population, had been officially transferred from Russia to Ukraine in 1954.

Although Ukraine's leaders took a tough negotiating stance toward Russia, their country's dependence on Russian energy left them with little maneuvering room. In September 1993, Ukrainian



Bill Day in the Detroit Free Press. Reprinted by permission: Tribune Media Services.



President Leonid Kravchuk agreed in principle to turn over to Russia nuclear warheads for dismantling in exchange for shipments of fuel for nuclear reactors. He also pledged to give up Ukraine's half of the Black Sea fleet in return for Russian promises to cancel Ukraine's \$2.5 billion debt for Russian oil. Members of Ukraine's parliament, however, later voted to hold onto 58 percent of the nuclear arsenal. In early 1994, the United States took the lead in hammering out a tentative agreement on nuclear arms with Ukrainian and Russian officials. President Kravchuk welcomed the talks, while holding firm to his position that Ukraine needed a substantial aid package and security guarantees before it would give up its nuclear weapons. Russian and U.S. officials were especially eager to reach a settlement with Ukraine. Without Ukrainian cooperation, the 1992 arms control agreement between Russia and the United States could not be implemented.

The two other states of the near abroad in which Russia has the most at stake have been Belarus and Kazakhstan. Both countries are home to substantial Russian communities and have nuclear weapons on their territory. Fortunately for Russia's policymakers, relations with both countries have proceeded smoothly. Belarus generally has followed Russia's lead on nuclear weapons, economic coordination, and other issues. Kazakhstan, where nearly 40 percent of the

population is Russian, likewise has taken a cautious path in seeking to avoid ethnic conflict between Russians and Muslim Kazakhs.

While Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan have been at the core of Russian foreign policy interests, the Yeltsin government increasingly has played an active role in other states of the near abroad. Underlying Russian policy has been a determined campaign to redefine a sphere of influence for the new Russia.

In the old Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe, as well as in the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Russia has limited its involvement. Nonetheless, Russian officials have made known their opposition to an expansion of Western influence in the region. President Yeltsin, for example, has rejected proposals to bring Poland, Hungary, the Czech republic, Slovakia, and even Lithuania into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), warning that such moves would revive military tension between Russia and the West.

Meanwhile, in much of the FSU, Russia has made its presence felt more directly. In Tajikistan, Yeltsin sent troops in 1993 to protect the government there from Islamic fundamentalist rebels based in neighboring Afghanistan. The Russian president justified his decision by maintaining that the Tajik-Afghan border "is in effect Russia's, not Tajikistan's." In Transcaucasia, a region where the Christian and Muslim worlds collide, Russia was accused of manipulating ethnic conflicts to advance its foreign policy aims. Georgia's leader, for example, claimed that Russia was behind an offensive by Abkhazi separatists to break free of Georgian control in the northwestern part of the country. In neighboring Azerbaijan, Russia was charged with aiding Armenians in Nagorno Karabakh in their campaign to gain independence from Azerbaijan.

I believe the time has come for distinguished international organizations, including the UN, to grant Russia special powers as a guarantor of peace and stability in the former regions of the USSR.

—Boris Yeltsin

Russia's heavy-handed tactics in Transcaucasia and Tajikistan dovetail with Yeltsin's broader strategy in the near abroad of strengthening the Commonwealth of Independent States. The leaders of Georgia and Azerbaijan, for example, agreed to join the CIS after their countries suffered military setbacks. Russian officials have expressed hope that the CIS will evolve into a close economic and military alliance. Along those lines, Russia spearheaded the formation in September 1993 of an economic union with eight other FSU countries. According to the agreement, the nine member states would work toward eliminating trade barriers among themselves. Participants would also be expected to follow Russian economic policies, but would benefit from discounted prices for Russian oil, gas, and other raw materials.

A cohesive CIS would also give Russia a stronger hand in protecting the 25 million Russians living outside Russia's borders. Yeltsin has been particularly sensitive to complaints that Russians have been the target of discrimination in the near abroad. He is also concerned that ill-treatment of Russians or conflict on Russia's periphery could trigger a flood of refugees into Russia. Finally, the Yeltsin government views a strong CIS as blocking non-Russian influence in the FSU. Yeltsin has drawn a line along the FSU's southern

frontier for Turkey and Iran, warning them not to intervene in the conflicts in Transcaucasia or Central Asia. Turkey, which has a long history of confrontation with Russia in Transcaucasia, has sided with Azerbaijan in its war to defeat Armenian forces in Nagorno Karabakh. In Central Asia, Russia fears that Iranian-inspired Islamic fundamentalism could spark political instability and eventually spread to the more than 20 million Muslims in Russia. Among pessimistic officials, there is worry that China or even Germany might try to exploit Russia's weakness.

CONCLUSION

Like the Russian people themselves, you will have an opportunity in the coming days to consider a range of alternatives for Russia's future. The three viewpoints, or Futures, that you will explore in the next part of this unit are written from a Russian perspective. Each is based on a distinct set of values and beliefs about the appropriate economic system, political structure, and foreign policy strategy for Russia. None of the three Futures recommends that Russia try to exert the influence of a global superpower, although extremists like Vladimir Zhirinovsky have called for the restoration, and even the expansion, of the Soviet empire. Rather, the Futures take into account the difficulties and constraints affecting Russia in the post-Soviet era.

You should think of the Futures as a tool designed to help you better understand the contrasting political philosophies from which the Russian people may choose. At the end of this unit, you will be asked to make your own choices about where Russia should be heading.

Futures in Brief

FUTURE 1 — STRENGTH IN UNITY

Although the Soviet Union is no more, very little else about the world has changed. The international arena remains a dangerous place, where Russian interests face constant threat. We cannot let our guard down. Only Russians can be expected to protect Russia's interests. Let us not forget what makes us unique: our ancient Slavic traditions, the Russian Orthodox Church, and our long history of international prestige and influence. Russia's future must carry on the greatness of our past. We must promote economic development that allows Russia to stand tall among the nations of the world, dependent on no one. In the area of foreign policy, we must clearly define a Russian sphere of influence that includes the FSU, Eastern Europe, and the countries to the south of the old Soviet borders. To ensure that no country tests our resolve, we must maintain our status as a military superpower.

FUTURE 2 — POWER TO THE PEOPLE

The collapse of the Soviet Union has presented the Russian people with a historic opportunity. For the first time in centuries, we Russians have a chance to break free of our authoritarian, militaristic past and address the problems of our people. To create a society where human needs rank above all else, we must look deep into our country's peasant traditions. Centralized government power — the force that has enslaved generation after generation of Russians — must give way to local control. Economic development must be considered in human terms, with renewed emphasis on the farming villages and traditional industries that constitute the backbone of our society. Our country's land, Mother Russia, must be restored and nurtured after decades of thoughtless environmental pollution. The army must be drastically reduced, and our foreign policy should seek to establish friendly, peaceful relations with our neighbors.

FUTURE 3 — EMBRACE THE WEST

The end of the Cold War brought down a barrier that had long separated Russia from the West. For the first time since 1917, we Russians have been invited to become part of Western civilization. The course of history is clear. Countries throughout the globe are adopting democracy, free-market economics, and respect for human rights. We must begin with a firm commitment to democracy and human rights. The competition of the free-market system must be allowed to transform our economy. Although there is little in the Russian experience to guide us in this transition, we have allies in the West to show us the way and provide economic investment. Likewise, our foreign policy should be closely linked to that of the West.

STRENGTH IN UNITY

Although the Soviet Union is no more, very little else about the world has changed. The international arena remains a dangerous place, where Russian interests face constant threat. The coming years will be especially difficult. As we Russians struggle to overcome the current economic and political crises, outside forces will inevitably seek to take advantage of our weakness. We cannot let our guard down. Only Russians can be expected to protect Russia's interests. Let us not forget what makes us unique: our ancient Slavic traditions, the Russian Orthodox Church, and our long history of international prestige and influence. We cannot turn our back on our destiny.

Russia's future must carry on the greatness of our past. The industrial strength that was developed in this century must be restored. Government and industry should work as partners to make Russia a respected leader in high-tech fields. We must promote economic development that allows Russia to stand tall among the nations of the world, dependent on no one. Foreign investment and technology should be allowed into Russia only on our terms. Russia's great reserves of oil, gas, gold, and other natural resources should be guarded from foreign exploitation, and our vital industries protected from unfair competition. In the area of foreign policy, we should try to establish friendly, mutually beneficial relations with other countries, but we must not neglect what is vital to our country's security. We must clearly define a Russian sphere of influence that includes the FSU, Eastern Europe, and the countries to the south of the old Soviet borders. To ensure that no country tests our resolve, we must maintain our status as a military superpower. Russia's greatness is forever.

What policies should Russia pursue?

Economically, Russia must concentrate on reviving industries that are essential to protecting its national security and restoring its position in the global economy. The energy and defense sectors should receive special attention from the government. Both industries are capable of generating export earnings and helping Russia end its dependence on foreign assistance. In other areas of the economy as well, the government should play a central role in reversing the decline in industrial production and protecting the stability of our society. Reckless free-market experiments have no place in Russia's future.

Politically, Russia needs a strong centralized government. The Western model of democracy is not suited to a country as vast and diverse as Russia. Rather, Russia must draw on its own political traditions. Russians demand a strong leader. The country needs a government with the authority to harness

Russia's enormous resources. Moreover, during these times of crisis Moscow must have the power to restrain the forces pulling our country apart.

In foreign policy, Russia must set an independent course. Extensive involvement in the countries of the FSU is necessary to protect Russian minorities and to safeguard Russia's security. Russia must continue to take the lead in forging closer economic and military ties among the CIS countries. In particular, Ukraine and Belarus must join with Russia in a union of the Slavic heartland. In Eastern Europe as well, Russia must reassert its long-established influence. Russia hopes to maintain friendly relations with all nations, but we insist that the other great powers respect our legitimate interests. To leave no doubt about our resolve, the strength of the Russian military, especially the nuclear arsenal, must not be allowed to deteriorate.

Lessons from history

The Russian character has been molded by geography. Spread over the vast plain of Eurasia, Russians have been exposed to invaders from all sides. Our people have had no choice but to rally around a strong state and a powerful army. In this century alone, Russia has faced the full might of Germany twice and squared off against the United

States in the tense Cold War. In the struggle against Nazi Germany, we were fighting an enemy who sought nothing less than our complete annihilation. A lesser people in similar circumstances would have perished long ago, but we Russians have learned that unity is the key to our survival.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Slowing down the pace of economic reform will help heal the divisions and sense of anxiety that have torn Russian society in recent years.
2. Re-establishing Russia's military strength will give Russia greater leverage in its dealings with other countries.
3. A strong, confident Russia will be welcomed by the West as a source of stability in Europe and Asia.
4. Tightening military cooperation between Russia and the other states of the FSU will save Russia the cost of rebuilding the defense installations, such as radar stations, that are located on what was the periphery of the Soviet Union.

&

CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Strengthening the hand of economic planners and government bureaucrats in Moscow will reverse the progress that has been made toward free-market reform.
2. Concentrating power in the central government will play into the hands of a future dictator seeking to recreate a police state and rebuild the Soviet empire.
3. A more assertive role for Russia in international affairs will lead to tension with the West and harm Russia's efforts to enter the global economy.
4. Renewed emphasis on foreign policy adventures and the military will divert resources from Russia's urgent economic, environmental, and social problems.
5. Pressuring the countries of the FSU to accept Russian dominance will sow the seeds of future conflict between Russia and its neighbors.
6. Bolstering the power of the authorities in Moscow will generate resentment in regions, such as Siberia, that have been exploited by the central government for centuries.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

The collapse of the Soviet Union has presented the Russian people with a historic opportunity. For the first time in centuries, we Russians have a chance to break free of our authoritarian, militaristic past and address the problems of our people. We do not face an enemy poised to attack us. There is no need to maintain a huge army or to impose Russian rule over our neighbors. The central government can no longer justify concentrating all power in its own hands and repressing the rights of the Russian people. To create a society where human needs rank above all else, we must look deep into our country's peasant traditions. We must recall the values of the Russian village, where the spiritual soul of our people was formed far from the heavy hand of the state.

The new Russia must put our people first. Centralized government power — the force that has enslaved generation after generation of Russians — must give way to local control. Economic development must be considered in human terms, with renewed emphasis on the farming villages and traditional industries that constitute the backbone of our society. We should turn away from the extreme individualism of the West and respect the importance of our nation's collective spirit. Our country's land, Mother Russia, must be restored and nurtured after decades of thoughtless environmental pollution. Russia must also adopt a new outlook toward its neighbors. Once and for all, we must bury our imperialistic past. Millions of Russians have suffered and died for the ambitions of our leaders. That must end. The army must be drastically reduced. Our foreign policy should seek to establish friendly, peaceful relations with our neighbors. Let the world know that a new day has dawned in Russia.

What policies should Russia pursue?

Economically, Russia must put human needs ahead of foreign policy priorities. The economy of the new Russia should be grounded in industries that will improve the lives of the Russian people without inflicting further damage on the environment. Agriculture will demand special attention. The state-run farms of the Soviet era must give way to cooperative villages where authority rests at the local level. In addition, industrial workers must be protected from the harmful effects of unemployment. The government should place special emphasis on converting defense industries to non-military production. In this period of economic turmoil, young industries should be shielded from unfair foreign competition and our natural resources should be protected from greedy foreign investors.

Politically, power in the new Russia should rest in the hands of the people. A balanced federal system should be created, like that in

the United States, that clearly divides political power among the local, regional, and central governments. Underlying the system should be a framework of basic democratic institutions, as well as guarantees to protect the rights of workers and farmers.

In foreign policy, Russia should have no ambitions beyond its own borders. Our neighbors in the FSU should have no fear of Russian aggression, but neither should they expect us to solve their problems. Elsewhere in the world, Russia should seek to normalize relations with other countries. Russia's international relations should be seen as a means for improving the lives of Russians at home. The Russian military should be sufficient to defend our country's borders, but there is no need to maintain an enormous nuclear arsenal, invest billions of rubles in the latest military technology, or provide a ready pool of troops for international missions led by the West.

Lessons from history

The growth of Russian state power, culminating in the horrors of Stalin's Soviet Union, has imposed an unbearable burden on the Russian people. Russian leaders have exploited fears about our country's security to concentrate power in their own hands. From the rule of Peter the Great to Nicholas II to Josef Stalin, millions of common Russian

peasants and workers fought and died to advance Russia's great power status. Millions more were worked to death on government projects, or forced to migrate to inhospitable areas — all in the name of the state's imperial ambitions. Ultimately, the Russian people have very little to show for centuries of suffering.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Putting to rest the notion that Russia has a special mission in the world will allow Russia to establish normal relations with other countries and lessen mistrust of Russian minorities in the FSU.
2. Focusing on the human and environmental costs of industrial growth will help Russia develop an economy in which its citizens lead happier, healthier lives.
3. Creating a balanced federal system will allow regional governments to build economic bridges that stretch across borders — for example, Siberia with China, St. Petersburg with Scandinavia, and the Far East with Japan.
4. Breaking up the political power of the central government will protect Russia against the ambitions of a would-be dictator.

&

CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Turning our back on issues of national security will encourage regional powers like Turkey, Iran, and China to spread their influence along our borders.
2. Retreating from our international responsibilities will leave Russian minorities at the mercy of anti-Russian regimes in the near abroad.
3. Trying to protect ourselves from the bumps and bruises of the global marketplace will doom Russia's economy to decades of backwardness.
4. Weakening the political authority of the central government will permit regional and local tyrants to abuse the rights of people under their control.
5. Without a strong central government, Russia will be pulled apart by its many regional interests and ethnic groups.
6. Cutting our military ties to the other countries of the FSU will leave Russia's borders vulnerable to attack.

EMBRACE THE WEST

The end of the Cold War brought down a barrier that had long separated Russia from the West. For the first time since 1917, we Russians have been invited to become part of Western civilization. In the past, Russians have failed to live up to the challenge. If we fail today, future generations of Russians will not forgive us. The course of history is clear. Countries throughout the globe are adopting democracy, free-market economics, and respect for human rights. We can no longer retreat into the ignorance, backwardness, and barbarity that has kept our people in chains. Generations of Russian reformers have been struck down by power-hungry tyrants before they could reach their goals. Now we must complete the journey and link Russia to the West.

The path Russia must follow has been paved by the countries of Western Europe and the United States. We must begin with a firm commitment to democracy and human rights. The rule of law must apply to everyone, including our leaders. Individual rights must be respected. Private property must be guaranteed. The competition of the free-market system must be allowed to transform our economy. Although there is little in the Russian experience to guide us in this transition, we have allies in the West to show us the way and provide economic investment. Likewise, our foreign policy should be closely linked to that of the West. Along with the United States, our country can play a key role in promoting global peace and harmony. There is no need for military priorities to dominate our society again, but our armed forces should be capable of contributing to international peacekeeping missions. Russia will not be transformed overnight, but ultimately we will be able to take our rightful place among the nations of the West.

What policies should Russia pursue?

Economically, Russia must strive to join the advanced economies of the United States, Western Europe, and East Asia in the global marketplace. The barriers to free-market competition must continue to be dismantled. Government subsidies to state-run industries should be sharply cut and foreign investment should be encouraged. The institution of private property should be clearly protected under the law. Entrepreneurial spirit, not government planning, is the engine that will generate jobs and prosperity in Russia's future.

Politically, the fundamental principles of democracy must guide Russia's future. Freedom of expression, respect for human rights, checks and balances among branches of government, and fair elections must be the cornerstones of Russia's political system. To ensure that these principles are applied

throughout our vast country, the central government must have the authority to control anti-democratic forces at the regional level.

In foreign policy, Russia's interests lie with those of the West. Russia should develop a close partnership with the United States, Western Europe, and Japan to ensure peace, stability, and global cooperation. Ultimately, this partnership should form the basis of a formal alliance linking Russia with the leading industrial democracies. Close relations between Russia and the West would help Russia spread the values of democracy and human rights elsewhere in the FSU. The Russian military should be downsized to meet its role in the new international system. Emphasis should be placed on creating a rapid deployment force that would be available to participate in international missions.

Lessons from history

Russian history is the story of missed opportunities. In the 1860s and in the years after 1905, Russia seemed headed on the path toward Western-style democracy. Both reform efforts were thwarted, however, by a conservative backlash. In 1917 after the overthrow of the tsar, a liberal democratic regime came to power only to be swept aside

by the communists. Gorbachev's reforms offered hope as well that Russia would finally join the West, but *perestroika* and *glasnost* proved to be half-hearted measures. History shows us that the forces separating Russia from the West are deeply entrenched. They can be overcome only by transforming society from top to bottom.

PROS

SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS

1. Creating an economic system that shares the same fundamental principles as the economies of the leading industrial democracies will help make Russia a major area of foreign investment.
2. A firm partnership with the West in international affairs will serve to deter Turkey, Iran, China, or other regional powers from trying to spread their influence in the countries of the FSU.
- & 3. As the experience of South Korea, Taiwan, and other rapidly industrializing countries has shown, close cooperation with the West is Russia's only route to economic development.
4. Opening Russia up to Western technology and investment will expose Russians to the latest advances in computers, biotechnology, telecommunications and other high-tech fields that they missed out on during the Soviet era.

CONS

OPPOSING ARGUMENTS

1. Closer economic and foreign policy ties between Russia and the West will leave Russia economically dependent and internationally weak.
2. The rush to the free-market economy, as even the reformers admit, will cost tens of millions of Russians their jobs.
3. Opening up Russia to foreign investment will lead to the exploitation of our natural resources and further damage to our environment.
4. A widening gap between rich and poor will undermine social stability and produce more crime and violence.
5. Close relations with the West will sharpen tensions between Russia and many non-Western countries, such as China, Iran, and the Muslim states of the FSU.
6. Maintaining a strong centralized government — even for the purpose of defending democracy — will leave Russia vulnerable in the event that an anti-democratic politician wins the presidency.

Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan

Homework: Before beginning the unit, students should read Part I of the background reading and complete "Study Guide — Part I."

DAY ONE

Reform in Russian history: review and preparation

Objective: This two-day role play will help students analyze the accomplishments and failures of four periods of reform in Russian history.

1. Explain to students that the unit they are beginning calls on them to wrestle with the most basic questions about the direction of Russian society. By way of comparison, ask students to consider the issues that faced the delegates to the Constitutional Convention in 1787. What was the impetus for the convention? What concerns were uppermost in the minds of the delegates? Which issues were most divisive? How do the challenges facing U.S. leaders in the 1780s compare to those confronting Russians today?

2. Form four groups of four students. Assign each of the groups a historical figure from Part I of the background reading (i.e., either Peter the Great, Alexander II, Nicholas II, or Mikhail Gorbachev). Distribute "Reform in Russian History" to each group. Explain that each group will make a brief presentation on Day Two of the unit on the reforms that took place under their assigned leader.

3. The remainder of the class should develop questions to be directed to the historical figures. Explain that Day Two will follow a television talk show format, with the groups representing historical figures making brief presentations and then fielding questions from the audience. (See "Reform in Russian History.")

Audience members should draft at least two questions for each historical figure. Questions should draw on Part I of the background reading. For example, an appropriate question for Nicholas II would be: *In what respect were Russian traditions an obstacle to your agricultural reforms?* Require audience members to turn in their questions at the end of the role play.

Homework: Students should complete preparations for the role play.

DAY TWO

Reform in Russian history: presentation and discussion

1. Organize the room so that the groups representing a historical figure face the audience members. Call on the talk show hosts to take charge of the presentations for their respective groups. Remind those speaking to stay in their assigned roles. After each presentation, invite members of the audience to ask questions.

2. At the conclusion of the role play, ask students to compare the four periods of reform. Were the four periods linked by common goals? Did they confront common obstacles? Which leaders were most committed to change? What advice would each of them give Russia's leaders today?

Homework: Students should read Part II of the background reading and complete "Study Guide — Part II." (Teachers may choose to review the study guide at the start of Day Three.)

DAY THREE

Exploring the three Futures: organization and preparation

Objective: This two-day simulation will familiarize students with issues that frame the debate on the direction of Russia's reform.

1. Inform students that they will participate in a simulation using the Futures and the background reading. Form three groups of four students. Assign a Future to each group. Distribute "Presenting Your Future" to the three Future groups. Inform students that each Future group will be called upon in Day Four to present the case for its assigned Future to a group of Russian voters. Explain that Future groups should follow the instructions in "Presenting Your Future." Note that the Future groups should begin by assigning each member a role. (As an extra challenge, ask the groups to design a campaign poster illustrating the best case for their Futures.)

2. Divide the remainder of the class into six groups and distribute "Speaking for the Russian Electorate" to each group. Assign each of the voter groups one of the following roles:

- a. Factory worker in the electronics industry
- b. Businessman involved in foreign trade
- c. Farm worker on a state-run wheat farm
- d. Director of a diamond mine in Yakutia
- e. Retired widow living on a government pension
- f. Returning soldier formerly stationed in Lithuania.

While the Future groups are preparing their presentations, members of the voter groups should develop questions to be directed to the Future groups on Day Four. Each voter group should prepare at least five questions for each of the Futures. (See "Speaking for the Russian Electorate.") Remind voter groups that they are expected to turn in their questions at the end of the simulation.

Homework: Students should complete preparations for the simulation.

DAY FOUR

Exploring the three Futures: debate and discussion

1. Organize the room so that the Future groups face the voter groups. Explain that the simulation will begin with three-to-five minute presentations by the spokespersons for the Future groups. Encourage the spokespersons to speak clearly and convincingly.

2. Following the presentations, invite members of the voter groups to ask questions. Make sure that the questions are equally distributed among all three Future groups. If time permits, encourage members of the Future groups to challenge the positions of other groups. During cross-examination, allow any Future group member to respond. (As an alternative approach, permit questions after each Future is presented.)

Homework: Students should read each of the three Futures, then fill out "Focusing Your Thoughts."

DAY FIVE

Charting Russia's future

Objective: This activity will help students weave their beliefs and assumptions into a broad political program for Russia.

1. Review the beliefs in "Focusing Your Thoughts," noting the relationship between the beliefs and Futures. Distribute "Dorogiye Gospada" (Dear Ladies and Gentlemen). Emphasize that the assignment in "Dorogiye Gospada" calls on students to imagine that they are appealing to Russian voters to support their program. The writing should be in the style of a campaign speech — persuasive and inspiring. Instruct students to use "Focusing Your Thoughts" as the basis for answering the questions of "Dorogiye Gospada."

2. As students begin formulating their ideas for "Dorogiye Gospada," ask them to share their thoughts with the class. Which beliefs do students find most appealing? Which lessons from history seem most relevant? Ask students to consider their recommendations from the perspective of the roles assigned to the voter groups during the simulation. How would the views of the retired widow differ from those of the farm worker? What issues are most likely to create divisions within the Russian electorate? What factors accounted for the success of extreme nationalists and communists in the December 1993 elections?

Homework: Students should complete "Dorogiye Gospada."

Alternative Three-Day Lesson Plan

DAY ONE: Ask students to consider the legacies of the four historical figures discussed in Part I of the background reading. What were the most important reforms that occurred during each period under consideration? What were the goals driving the reform efforts? What opposition did the reforms encounter? Call on students to put themselves in the shoes of Russians today. What lessons from the past are most relevant to Russia's present circumstances?

DAY TWO: Assign each student one of the three Futures, and allow a few minutes for students to familiarize themselves with the mindsets of the Futures. Call on students to evaluate the benefits and trade-offs of their assigned Future. How do the Futures differ in their overall philosophies? Ask students to respond to a current issue, such as the plight of Russian defense industries or the conflict with Japan over the Kuril Islands, from the perspective of their assigned Future. Moving beyond the Futures, ask students to imagine they are Russian voters. Which beliefs should guide Russia's economic policy and political organization? Which international concerns should rank at the top of the Russian foreign policy agenda? Students should complete "Focusing Your Thoughts" as homework.

DAY THREE: See Day Five of the Suggested Five-Day Lesson Plan.

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Reform in Russian History

Your Assignment: Your group has been given the responsibility of making a brief presentation to your classmates about an important reformer in Russian history. Your group's presentation will follow the format of a television talk show. Individual group members will explain the views of their assigned characters and then field questions from the audience. While members of your group are in front of the class, they are expected to play the role of their assigned characters.

Your group should review the section of Part I of the background reading that deals with the historical figure you have been assigned. You are also encouraged to make use of other resources, such as encyclopedias, to gather information about your historical figure.

Organizing Your Group: Each member of your group will take a specific role. Below is a brief explanation of the responsibilities for each role.

1. *Talk show host:* Your job is to organize and direct the overall presentation of your group. You should plan to ask the other members of your group a few questions. The questions should be designed to allow your partners to fully explain their roles to the class. Work closely with the other members of your group to develop good questions.
2. *Historical figure:* Your job is to play the role of the historical figure assigned to your group. You will respond to questions by your group's talk show host, taking no more than three minutes for your interview. You will then field questions from the audience. Prepare yourself to discuss the reforms that took place under your regime.
3. *Supporter of historical figure:* Your job is to play the role of a supporter of the historical figure assigned to your group. You will respond to questions by your group's talk show host, taking no more than three minutes for your interview. You will then field questions from the audience. You should begin your preparations by more clearly defining your role. To which social class would a supporter of your group's historical figure most likely belong? What would be his or her occupation? What would be the basis for his or her support of your group's historical figure? Prepare yourself to answer these and other questions.
4. *Opponent of historical figure:* Your job is to play the role of an opponent of the historical figure assigned to your group. You will respond to questions by your group's talk show host, taking no more than three minutes for your interview. You will then field questions from the audience. You should begin your preparations by more clearly defining your role. To which social class would an opponent of your group's historical figure most likely belong? What would be his or her occupation? What would be the basis for his or her opposition to your group's historical figure? Prepare yourself to answer these and other questions.

Name: _____

Study Guide — Part I
Learning from Russia's Past

1. What accounts for the belief held by many Russians that their country has a special mission in the world?

2. Why was Peter the Great eager to expose his country to the changes taking place in Western Europe?

3. In what ways did Russia become more Westernized under Alexander II?

4. How did Nicholas II try to control the forces pushing Russia toward revolution?

5. How did the reforms of Mikhail Gorbachev contribute to the collapse of the Soviet Union?

Name: _____

Study Guide — Part II
The New Russia

1. What were the most important reforms undertaken by Boris Yeltsin in late 1991 and early 1992?

2. How would a factory manager in a plant that produces sophisticated fighter aircraft view Russia's economic reforms?

3. Why have voices favoring greater regional power grown louder as Russia has begun to enter the global economy?

4. Based on the results of the December 1993 elections, which aspects of Yeltsin's policies have caused the greatest discontent among Russian voters?

5. Why have Russian-Ukrainian relations been at the center of Russian foreign policy?

6. How has the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) helped serve Russia's foreign policy goals in the near abroad?

Presenting Your Future

Day One — Preparing Your Presentation

Your Assignment: Your group is scheduled to appear before a gathering of Russian voters. Your assignment is to persuade the voters that your Future should serve as Russia's guiding philosophy in the coming years. (The next presidential election in Russia will be held in 1996.) You will be judged on how well you present your Future.

Organizing Your Group: Each member of your group will take a specific role. Below is a brief explanation of the responsibilities for each role.

1. *Spokesperson:* Your job is to explain the position of your group to the voters in a three-to-five minute presentation. In preparing your presentation, you will receive help from the other members of your group. You should include arguments from their areas of expertise. Keep in mind, though, that you are expected to take the lead in organizing your group. Read your Future and review the background reading to build a strong case for your Future.
2. *Economic adviser:* Your job is to tell the spokesperson of your group why your Future is justified from an economic standpoint. You should draw on both history and current events to support your position. Read your Future, paying close attention to the paragraph on economic policy, and then review the sections of the background reading that deal with your area of expertise.
3. *Political adviser:* Your job is to tell the spokesperson of your group why your Future is justified from the standpoint of Russia's political organization. You should draw on both history and current events to support your position. Read your Future, paying close attention to the paragraph on political policy, and then review the sections of the background reading that deal with your area of expertise.
4. *Foreign policy adviser:* Your job is to tell the spokesperson of your group why your Future is justified from a foreign policy standpoint. You should draw on both history and current events to support your position. Read your Future, paying close attention to the paragraph on foreign policy, and then review the sections of the background reading that deal with your area of expertise.

Day Two — Making Your Case

On Day Two, your spokesperson will deliver a three-to-five minute presentation to the gathering of Russian voters. Notes may be used, but the spokesperson should speak clearly and convincingly. During the presentation, you should try to identify the weak points of the other Futures. After all of the groups have presented their Futures, the voters will ask you questions. Any member of your group may respond during the question-and-answer period.

Speaking for the Russian Electorate

Understanding Your Role: Your group has been called upon to express the concerns of a Russian voter. You will take part in a forum for Russian presidential candidates. (The next presidential election in Russia will be held in 1996.) You will hear about three distinct political philosophies, or Futures, for Russia in the coming years. You are expected to evaluate each of the Futures from the perspective of the character your group has been designated to represent. Your group will be assigned one of the following roles.

1. *Factory worker:* You work in a large electronics factory in western Siberia. Your factory has suffered a sharp drop in orders in recent years, due mostly to cuts in military spending. Meanwhile, the consumer products your factory produces lack the quality of imports from East Asia and the West. Although the managers of your factory have managed to avoid layoffs — thanks mainly to government subsidies — your wages have not kept pace with inflation. You are unable to buy little more than bread, potatoes, and cabbage for your family. At 52 years old and possessing few skills, your chances of finding another job are poor.

2. *Businessman:* Since the collapse of communism, you have become involved in trade with Western Europe. You have been particularly successful at exporting Russian artwork and handicrafts. Although you are only 25 years old, your income is already three times as much as that of your parents, who are both engineers. Your business, which is based in Moscow, has allowed you to travel in Western Europe and buy Western goods that the great majority of Russians cannot afford.

3. *Farm worker:* You work on a large state-run wheat farm in southern Russia, not far from the Black Sea. Life on the farm has always been difficult, but in recent years conditions have worsened. Spare parts for broken farm equipment and storage facilities seldom arrive. Each year, your farm loses a bigger share of its grain to rot and mice. At 31 years old, you are lucky to at least have a two-acre plot of your own to grow vegetables and raise chickens for your family. You are also able to sell the surplus in a nearby city.

4. *Diamond mine director:* You are the director of a diamond mine in the region of Yakutia in eastern Siberia. Your mine is located in an area that contains one of Russia's richest deposits of diamonds. You have been approached by several Western investors hoping to enter into a partnership with your enterprise. They have pledged to provide your mine with new technology that could double production. The authorities in Moscow, however, have so far refused to accept the foreign proposals or grant you greater decision-making power. At 45 years old, you earn a good salary compared to most Russians, but you are poorly paid by international standards.

5. *Retired pensioner:* You are a 74-year-old widow living off a government pension in northern Russia. During your working years, you and your husband were employed at a textile factory and earned below-average salaries. Like almost all Russians at the time, you saved only a few hundred rubles for emergencies and expected the government to provide for you during your retirement. Now that the Soviet system has collapsed, many of your old assumptions are no longer valid. The purchasing power of your pension has shrunk over recent years to the point that today you can afford little more than bread and tea. With no children and your husband deceased, you may have no choice but to turn to your sister's family for help.

6. *Returning soldier:* You are a 23-year-old tank commander in the Russian army who until recently was serving in Lithuania. In late 1993, your unit was transferred to western Russia. The move has meant hardship for you, your wife, and your baby daughter. As in other areas of Russia, housing is scarce in the town where you are now stationed. You have been forced to share a one-bedroom apartment with another soldier and his family. While you were based in Lithuania, you and your wife were often the target of insults from local residents angry at the continued presence of the Russian army.

Your Assignment: Your group should prepare at least five questions for each Future from the perspective of your assigned character. The questions should reflect the concerns and interests of your assigned role. For example, an appropriate question about Future 1 from the factory worker would be: *Where would the investment and resources for our factory come from in the economic system that you propose?* On Day Two of the activity, you will have an opportunity to address some of your questions to the Future groups. At the end of the activity, you will be expected to turn in your questions.

Focusing Your Thoughts

Instructions: You have had an opportunity to consider three Futures for Russia. Now it is your turn to look at each of the Futures from your own perspective. Try each one on for size. Think about how the Futures address the concerns and hopes of the Russian people. You will find that each has its own risks and trade-offs, advantages and disadvantages.

Ranking the Options

Which of the Futures below do you prefer? Keep in mind that the beliefs you support most strongly should guide your choice. Rank the Futures, with "1" being the best Future for Russia to follow.

- ___ **Future 1: Strength in Unity**
- ___ **Future 2: Power to the People**
- ___ **Future 3: Embrace the West**

Beliefs

Considering the statements below will help you answer the questions of "Dorogiye Gospada" (Dear Ladies and Gentlemen). Rate each of the statements according to your personal beliefs:

- | | | |
|----------------------|---------------------|---------------|
| 1 = Strongly Support | 3 = Oppose | 5 = Undecided |
| 2 = Support | 4 = Strongly Oppose | |

- ___ Russia and the countries of the West share a common set of goals and interests.
- ___ There will always be countries eager to take advantage of Russia's weaknesses.
- ___ The ambitions of Russia's leaders have been largely responsible for the suffering of the Russian people.
- ___ The government's emphasis on industrial growth has harmed both the Russian people and the environment.
- ___ The political and economic systems of the West are destined to sweep over the entire world.
- ___ The key to Russia's rebirth lies in reviving the spiritual soul of the nation.
- ___ Social stability and economic security are more important than individual freedom.
- ___ Without a strong state, Russia would have been crushed by invaders.
- ___ Russia is not suited to Western-style democracy.

Creating Your Own Future

Your next assignment is to create a Future that reflects your own beliefs and opinions. You may borrow heavily from one Future, or you may combine ideas from two or three Futures. Or you may take a new approach altogether. There are, of course, no perfect solutions. And there is no right or wrong answer. Rather, you should strive to craft a Future that is logical and persuasive. Be careful of contradictions. For example, you should not base Russia's economic development on agriculture and light industry if you believe that Russia should continue to be a military superpower. The "Dorogiye Gospada" (Dear Ladies and Gentlemen) worksheet will help you organize your ideas.

Name: _____

"Dorogiye Gospada" (Dear Ladies and Gentlemen)

Instructions: On December 12, 1993, Russians voted in the freest elections in Russian history. During the election campaign, they heard from thirteen political groups vying for seats in the Federal Assembly, Russia's parliament. In 1996, they are scheduled to go the polls again to choose a president. In this exercise, you will outline a campaign speech based on your own ideas for Russia's future.

1. Write an introduction to your campaign speech that expresses the basic principles of your political philosophy for Russia.

2. Explain your proposals for Russia's economic development.

3. Explain your proposals for Russia's political organization.

4. Explain your proposals for Russia's foreign policy.

5. In conclusion, explain how Russia will change over the next ten years if your proposals are adopted.

Supplementary Documents for the Teacher

Speech by Josef Stalin, entitled "The Tasks of Business Executives" February 1931

...Science, technical experience, knowledge, are all things that can be acquired. We may not have them today, but tomorrow we will. The main thing is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master technique, to master the science of production. Everything can be achieved, everything can be overcome, if there is a passionate desire to do so.

It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by our obligations to the working class of the whole world.

To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. And those who fall behind get beaten! One feature of the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her — because of her backwardness, military backwardness, cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial backwardness, and agricultural backwardness. They beat her because to do so was profitable and could be done with impunity. Do you remember the words of the prerevolutionary poet: "You are poor and abundant, mighty and impotent, Mother Russia." Those gentlemen were quite familiar with the verses of the old poet. They beat her saying: "You are abundant," so one can enrich oneself at your expense. They beat her saying: "You are poor and impotent," so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. Such is the law of the exploiters — to beat the backward and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. You are backward, you are weak — therefore you are wrong; hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty — therefore you are right; hence, we must be wary of you.

That is why we must no longer lag behind.

In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have a fatherland, and we will defend its independence. Do you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose its independence? If you do not want this you must put an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time and develop genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its socialist system of economy. There is no other way. That is why Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: "Either perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries."

We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed.

This is what our obligations to the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. dictate to us.

But we have other, still more serious and more important obligations. They are obligations to the world proletariat. They coincide with our obligations to the workers and the peasants of the U.S.S.R. But we place them higher. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world working class. We achieved victory not solely through the efforts of the working class of the U.S.S.R., but also thanks to the support of the working class of the world. Without this support we would have been torn to pieces long ago. It is said that our country is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. This is a fitting definition. But this imposes very serious obligations upon us. Why does the international proletariat support us? How did we merit this support? By the fact that we were the first to hurl ourselves into the battle against capitalism, we were the first to establish a working-class state, we were the first to start building socialism. By the fact that we are doing work which, if successful, will change the whole world and free the entire working class. But what is needed for success? The elimination of our backwardness, the development of a high Bolshevik tempo of construction. We must march forward in such a way that the working class of the

whole world, looking at us, may say: This is my vanguard, this is my shock brigade, this is my working-class state, this is my fatherland; they are promoting their cause, which is *our* cause, and they are doing this well; let us support them against the capitalists and promote the cause of the world revolution. Must we not live up to the hopes of the world's working class, must we not fulfill our obligations to them? Yes, we must if we do not want utterly to disgrace ourselves.

Such are our obligations, internal and international.

As you see, they dictate to us a Bolshevik tempo of development.

I will not say that we have accomplished nothing in regard to economic management during these years. In fact, we have accomplished a good deal. We have doubled our industrial output as compared with the prewar level. We have created the largest-scale agricultural production in the world. But we could have accomplished more had we tried hard during this period really to master production, the technique of production, the financial and economic side of it.

In ten years at most we must make good the distance that separates us from the advanced capitalist countries. We have all the "objective" possibilities for this. The only thing lacking is the ability to take proper

advantage of these possibilities. And that depends on us. *Only on us!* It is time we learned to take advantage of these possibilities. It is time to put an end to the rotten policy of noninterference in production. It is time to adopt a new policy, a policy adapted to the present times — the policy of *interfering in everything*. If you are a factory manager, then interfere in all the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing escape you, learn and learn again. Bolsheviks must master technique. It is time Bolsheviks themselves became experts. In the period of reconstruction technique decides everything. And a business executive who does not want to master technique is a joke and not an executive.

It is said that it is hard to master technique. That is not true! There are no fortresses which Bolsheviks cannot capture. We have solved a number of most difficult problems. We have overthrown capitalism. We have assumed power. We have built up a huge socialist industry. We have swung the middle peasants to the path of socialism. We have already accomplished what is most important from the point of view of construction. What remains to be done is not so much: to study technique, to master science. And when we have done that we will develop a tempo of which we dare not even dream at present.

And we will do that if we really want to....

The "Secret Speech" by Nikita Khrushchev
Delivered to the 20th Soviet Communist Party Congress, February 24, 1956

...Comrades: The cult of the individual acquired such monstrous size chiefly because Stalin himself, using all conceivable methods, supported the glorification of his own person. This is supported by numerous facts. One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-gratification and his lack of even elementary modesty is the edition of his *Short Biography*, which was published in 1948....

We need not give here examples of the loathsome adulation filling this book. All we need to add is that they all were approved and edited by Stalin personally and some of them were added in his own handwriting to the draft text of the book.

What did Stalin consider essential to write in his book? Did he want to cool the ardor of his flatterers who were composing his *Short Biography*? No! He marked the very places where he thought the praise of his services was insufficient.

Here are some examples characterizing Stalin's activity, added in Stalin's own hand:

"In this fight against the skeptics and capitulators, the Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites and Kamenevites, there was definitely welded together, after Lenin's death, that leading the Party...that upheld the great manner of Lenin, rallied the Party behind Leninist behests, and brought the Soviet people into the broad road of industrializing the country and collectivizing the rural economy. The leader of this core and the guiding force of the Party and the State was Comrade Stalin."

Thus writes Stalin himself! Then he adds:

"Although he performed his task of leader of the Party and the people with consummate skill and enjoyed the unreserved support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin never allowed his work to be marred by the slightest hint of vanity, conceit or self-adulation."

Where and when could a leader so praise himself? Is this worthy of a leader of the Marxist-Leninist type? No. Precisely against this did Marx and Engels take such a strong position. This also was always sharply condemned by Vladimir Ilyich Lenin....

Stalin recognized as the best a text of the national anthem of the Soviet Union which contains not a word about the Communist Party; it contains, however, the following unprecedented praise of Stalin: "*Stalin*

brought us up in loyalty to the people. He inspired us to great toil and acts."

In these lines of the anthem is the whole educational, directional, and inspirational activity of the great Leninist party ascribed to Stalin. This is, of course, a clear deviation from Marxism-Leninism, a clear debasing and belittling of the role of the party. We should add for your information that the Presidium of the Central Committee has already passed a resolution concerning the composition of a new text of the anthem, which will reflect the role of the people, and the role of the party. (Loud, prolonged applause.)

And was it without Stalin's knowledge that many of the largest enterprises and towns were named after him? Was it without his knowledge that Stalin monuments were erected in the whole country — these "memorials to the living"? It is a fact that Stalin himself had signed on July 2, 1951, a resolution of the USSR Council of Ministers concerning the erection on the Volga-Don Canal of an impressive monument to Stalin; on September 4 of the same year he issued an order making 33 tons of copper available for the construction of this impressive monument. Anyone who has visited the Stalingrad area must have seen the huge statue which is being built there, and that on a site which hardly any people frequent. Huge sums were spent to build it at a time when people of this area had lived since the war in huts. Consider yourself, was Stalin right when he wrote in his biography that "...he did not allow in himself...even a shadow of conceit, pride, or self-adoration"?

At the same time Stalin gave proofs of his lack of respect for Lenin's memory. It is not a coincidence that, despite the decision taken over 30 years ago to build a Palace of Soviets as a monument to Vladimir Ilyich, this palace was not built, its construction was always postponed, and the project allowed to lapse.

We cannot forget to recall the Soviet Government resolution of August 14, 1925, concerning the "founding of Lenin prizes for educational work." This resolution was published in the press, but until this day there are no Lenin prizes. This, too, should be corrected. (Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)

During Stalin's life, thanks to known methods which I have mentioned, and quoting facts, for

instance, from the *Short Biography of Stalin* — all events were explained as if Lenin played only a secondary role, even during the October Socialist Revolution. In many films and in many literary works, the figure of Lenin was incorrectly presented and inadmissibly depreciated.

Stalin loved to see the film *The Unforgettable Year of 1919*, in which he was shown on the steps of an armored train and where he was practically vanquishing the foe with his own saber. Let Kliment Yefremovich [Voroshilov, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, 1953-1960], our dear friend, find the necessary courage to write the truth about Stalin; after all, he knows how Stalin had fought. It will be difficult for Comrade Voroshilov to undertake this, but it would be good if he did it. Everyone will approve of it, both the people and the party. Even his grandsons will thank him. (Prolonged applause.)

In speaking about the events of the October Revolution and about the civil war, the impression was created that Stalin always played the main role, as if everywhere and always Stalin had suggested to Lenin what to do and how to do it. However, this is slander to Lenin. (Prolonged applause.)

I will probably not sin against the truth when I say that probably 99 percent of the persons present here heard and knew very little about Stalin before the year 1924, while Lenin was known to all; he was known to the whole party, to the whole nation, from the children to the graybeards. (Tumultuous, prolonged applause.)

All this has to be thoroughly revised, so that history, literature, and the fine arts properly reflect V.I. Lenin's role and the great deeds of our Communist Party and of the Soviet people — the creative people. (Applause.)

Comrades! The cult of the individual has caused the employment of faulty principles in party work and in economic activity; it brought about rude violation of internal party and Soviet democracy, sterile administration, deviations of all sorts, covering up of short comings and varnishing of reality. Our nation gave birth to many flatterers and specialists in false optimism and deceit.

We should also not forget that due to the numerous arrests of party, Soviet and economic leaders, many workers began to work uncertainly, showed over-cautiousness, feared all which was new, feared

their own shadows and began to see less initiative in their work....

Stalin's reluctance to consider life's realities and the fact that he was not aware of the real state of affairs in the provinces can be illustrated by his direction of agriculture.

All those who interested themselves even a little in the national situation saw the difficult situation in agriculture, but Stalin never even noted it. Did we tell Stalin about this? Yes, we told him, but he did not support us. Why? Because Stalin never travelled anywhere, did not meet city and *kolkhoz* workers; he did not know the actual situation in the provinces.

He knew the country and agriculture only from films. And these films had dressed up and beautified the existing situation in agriculture....

Vladimir Ilyich Lenin looked at life differently; he was always close to the people; he used to receive peasant delegates, and often spoke at factory gatherings; he used to visit villages and talk with the peasants.

Stalin separated himself from the people and never went anywhere. This lasted tens of years. The last time he visited a village was in January 1928 when he visited Siberia in connection with grain deliveries. How then could he have known the situation in the provinces?...

Comrades! If we sharply criticize today the cult of the individual which was so widespread during Stalin's life and if we speak about the many negative phenomena generated by this cult which is so alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, various persons may ask: How could it be? Stalin headed the party and the country for 30 years and many victories were gained during his lifetime. Can we deny this? In my opinion, the question can be asked in this manner only by those who are blinded and hopelessly hypnotized by the cult of the individual, only by those who do not understand the essence of the revolution and of the Soviet state, only by those who do not understand, in a Leninist manner, the role of the party and of the nation in the development of the Soviet society.

The Socialist Revolution was attained by the working class and by the poor peasantry with the partial support of the middle-class peasants. It was attained by the people under the leadership of the Bolshevik Party. Lenin's great service consisted of the fact that he created a militant party of the working class,

but he was armed with Marxist understanding of the laws of social development and with the science of proletarian victory in the fight with capitalism, and he steeled this party in the crucible of revolutionary struggle of the masses of the people.

During this fight the party consistently defended the interests of the people, became its experienced leader, and led the working masses to power, to the creation of the first socialist state....

Our historical victories were attained thanks to the organizational work of the party, to the many provincial organizations, and to the self-sacrificing work of our great nation. These victories are the result of the great drive and activity of the nation and of the party as a whole; they are not at all the fruit of the leadership of Stalin, as the situation was pictured during the period of the cult of the individual....

In the last years, when we managed to free ourselves of the harmful practice of the cult of the individual and took several proper steps in the sphere of internal and external policies, everyone saw how activity grew before their very eyes, how the creative activity of the broad working masses developed, how favorably all of this acted upon the development of economy and of culture. (Applause.)....

Comrades: We must abolish the cult of the individual decisively, once and for all; we must draw the proper conclusions concerning both ideological-theoretical and practical work. It is necessary for this purpose:

First, in a Bolshevik manner to condemn and to eradicate the cult of the individual as alien to Marxism-Leninism and not consonant with the principles of party leadership and the norms of party life, and to fight inexorably all attempts at bringing back this practice in one form or another.

To return to and actually practice in all our ideological work the most important theses of Marxist-Leninist science about the people as the creator of history and as the creator of all material and

spiritual good of humanity, about the decisive role of the Marxist party in the revolutionary fight for the transformation of society, about the victory of communism.

In this connection we will be forced to do much work in order to examine critically from the Marxist-Leninist viewpoint and to correct the widely spread erroneous views connected with the cult of the individual in the sphere of history, philosophy, economy and of the other sciences, as well as in literature and the fine arts. It is especially necessary that in the immediate future we compile a serious textbook of the history of our party which will be edited in accordance with the scientific Marxist objectivism, a textbook of the history of Soviet society, a book pertaining to the events of the civil war and the Great Patriotic War.

Secondly, to continue systematically and consistently the work done by the party's Central Committee during the last ten years, a work characterized by minute observation in all party organizations, from the bottom to the top, of the Leninist principles of party leadership, characterized, above all, by the main principle of collective leadership, characterized by the observation of the norms of party life described in the statutes of our party, and finally, characterized by the wide practice of criticism and self-criticism.

Thirdly, to restore completely the Leninist principles of Soviet socialist democracy, expressed in the Constitution of the Soviet Union, to fight willfulness of individuals abusing their power. The evil caused by acts violating revolutionary socialist legality which have accumulated during a long time as a result of the negative influence of the cult of the individual has to be completely corrected.

Comrades! The 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has manifested with a new strength the unshakable unity of our party, its cohesiveness around the Central Committee, its resolute will to accomplish the great task of building communism. (Tumultuous applause.)....

Speech by Boris Yeltsin on Russia's Draft Constitution November 9, 1993

Esteemed citizens of Russia: Work of great importance for our country was completed yesterday. A draft constitution of the Russian Federation is ready. It will be published tomorrow.

This work lasted for more than three years. It was intense and complicated. At times it was even dramatic.

All this time, one and the same question was voiced by politicians as well as by common citizens: Do we need a new constitution? Can we not do with the old one, after patching it up? Life itself has replied to this question. It is now clear that if a new constitution had been adopted in time we would have protected democracy without resorting to extreme measures.

A dear price has had to be paid for the lack of a democratic constitution. With its adoption, a powerful tool will appear with which to solve the most acute problems of state and society.

We need order, but not the horrible repressive order of the Stalinist camps. Russia needs a durable legal order. Not an arm of iron but a democratic state power that will ensure progress toward a normal and worthy life for citizens, toward prosperity for a single, integral Russia.

The draft constitution will be put to a referendum on December 12. Every citizen of this country will be able to say yes or no to the draft constitution.

I think that today this is the only way to adopt a new constitution. It must be adopted by the people.

Only with the will of the people as the basis, the Russian state can be consolidated, and the vestiges of the communist and Soviet past, the vestiges of dual power, can be done away with.

A firm, constitutional basis is needed now as never before for the activity of all branches of power, for the constructive interaction of the president, the government, the federal assembly, and the judiciary. We can have it [the basis] ready in one month.

The draft constitution is a fruit of three years of hard work. The Constitutional Commission and then the Constitutional Assembly worked to draw it up. At the latest stage, the Constitutional Assembly's state and public arms worked on it. The country's best lawyers took part in this effort.

The text reflects numerous proposals and wishes expressed by the subjects of the federation, political and public associations, research collectives, specialists, and citizens. The draft constitution was assessed by experts in our country and abroad. Immense work has been done.

Now you, citizens of Russia, must have the final say.

Skeptics say that a majority of people will never read the text of the constitution and will not be able to comprehend this complex matter.

This argument is well known to us from the past. Whenever it was found expedient, the people's opinion was used as a screen. When not, then it was said: The people will not understand this, the people are not ready.

Indeed, a common individual may find it impossible to understand all the juridical subtleties of the text of the constitution, but concerning its main principles and ideas, I think our citizens are not only able to sort them out but have in fact long since done so.

First of all, the new constitution is a constitution of a democratic law-governed state.

In such a state, it is not a separate class, a nation, or another group but the individual is the ultimate value. In accordance with the new constitution, the prime duty of power is to observe and protect the rights and freedoms of the individual and citizen. We shall come to this by all means, even if not at once.

Here are just a few provisions of the new constitution:

All citizens of Russia are equal before the law and the court.

Personal dignity is protected by the state.

No one must be subjected to violence, to treatment, or punishment which is cruel and offends human dignity.

Everyone has the right to privacy, personal and family secrets, to protection of one's honor, and to their good name.

Everyone is guaranteed the right to enjoy the freedom of conscience and faith, freedom of thought and expression, unhampered expression of one's views and convictions. The struggle with alternate thinking, in which our country showed itself so

adamant in the past, is banned.

Under the new constitution, every citizen of Russia has the right to use freely his or her abilities and property to engage in entrepreneurial and other economic activity not prohibited by law.

After a 70-year ban, the right to private ownership, including private land ownership, is proclaimed. With the adoption of the constitution a strong barrier is put up against expropriations and nationalizations.

In accordance with the constitution, everyone has the right to work and to protection against unemployment. The right to rest and recreation is proclaimed.

The Russian constitution lays down a system of social insurance for citizens.

The family, maternity, and childhood are placed under state protection.

Everyone has the right to housing, and citizens within the low-income bracket, will get it free of charge or at an affordable price.

Every Russia citizen has the right to health protection, to medical care. Medical care is provided free of charge in state-owned and municipal medical institutions.

Everyone has the right to an education. It is provided also free of charge in state-owned and municipal educational establishments.

Under the constitution everyone has the right to a sound environment, to reliable information about the state of the environment, and to compensation for damage done by any breach of the laws on the environment.

Under the new constitution, every citizen has the right to state compensation for damage caused by unlawful actions or lack of action on the part of bodies of state authority or officials.

Nobody in Russia is permitted to abuse the rights, freedoms, and lawful interests of other citizens, undermine the basis of the legal status of the individual, the constitutional system, the defense capacity and security of the country.

I have mentioned just a few provisions laid down in the constitution, but on the whole I can say that the level of guaranteed human rights and freedoms and the mechanism of their protection correspond to modern international standards. Russia has not yet had a constitution like this one.

The constitution of Russia is a constitution of a

democratic republic. No single individual, no single institution of the state has the right to claim the fullness of power. The principle of separation of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers is consistently inherent in the draft. Every agency, every official will act independently within the frame of competence.

The constitution sets up a dependable barrier to confrontation between them. Indeed, it orientates the branches of power toward concerted efforts, toward interaction and not toward settling accounts.

In exceptional cases the president gets the right to dissolve the State Duma, and the parliament the right to impeach the president.

The constitution of Russia lays down the principles of ideological freedom and a multiparty system. No ideology, no party will henceforth have the right to claim exclusive domination.

A most important question regulated for the first time on the constitutional level is the question about the federative system of Russia. The new constitution is a constitution of a truly federative state.

The constitution proclaims that all the republics, territories, regions and autonomous areas within the federation have equal rights and equal status.

Along with this, state authorities have no intention whatsoever to infringe on the spiritual and cultural identities of nationalities.

Just on the contrary, they support and will support the understandable and lawful desire of all peoples of Russia to preserve and develop their native languages, culture, and traditions. This applies in full measure also to the Russian people.

Within the final stage of the preparation of the draft constitution we succeeded in improving its text substantially. A number of dangerous provisions imposed by the former Supreme Soviet were deleted.

The procedure of adopting amendments was made much more complicated. Nobody will henceforth be permitted to redraw the constitution to suit anyone's whims.

Esteemed citizens of Russia: There are no miracles. After we adopt the constitution, it will take some time for the life of this state to be put on a normal track. Nonetheless the adoption of the constitution is an event of immense importance.

All developed states have traversed their own difficult path on the way towards their present

prosperity. Now Russia is determining its strategic perspective in adopting a constitution.

We need a constitution in order not to dash from one extreme to another, in order to calm down, in order to make fewer mistakes.

Of course, it will not be easy to learn to live by the rules proclaimed in the constitution, but let us begin. Our children will accomplish what our generation does not have time to do.

A referendum on the constitution will be a serious test for the citizens and politicians of Russia.

It is no secret that not all people are interested in it.

The forces which sought to unleash civil war in October do not need this constitution.

Separatists do not need the constitution. The consolidation of the Russian state means an end to their own ambitious plans.

A new constitution is a bane to criminal, mafia-style corrupt groups, because it established a strong state power and, hence, law and order.

The absolute majority of honest citizens need this constitution.

All those who want Russia to have neither dictatorship nor dictators nor arbitrariness nor violence are for this constitution.

All those who want democracy and freedom, stability and peace to take root in Russia, who want all peoples of our country to live in concord and cooperation are for the constitution.

All those whom the word Russia makes feel proud and excited, who want it to be a great and prosperous state are for the new constitution.

I have no doubt that you, my dear compatriots, are for this, for Russia.

Thank you.

Suggested Readings

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